Opinion
By Monday Ubani, SAN
TODAY’s judgment delivered by Justice M.G. Umar of the Federal High Court, Abuja, nullifying the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)’s deadline requiring political parties to submit their membership registers by May 10, 2026, has introduced a major constitutional and electoral debate in Nigeria’s democratic process.
The court held that INEC could not lawfully abridge the statutory period provided under Section 29(1) of the Electoral Act, 2026, which stipulates that political parties shall submit the particulars of their candidates not later than 120 days before the election.
Consequently, the court ruled that political parties and intending defectors have until September 2026 to regularize party membership and submit relevant registers.
Truth be told, this decision appears legally authoritative when examined against the supremacy of statutory provisions over administrative guidelines.
Section 29(1) of the Electoral Act, 2026 is explicit and mandatory. Once the National Assembly has fixed a timeline for submission of candidates’ particulars, INEC, being a statutory creation, cannot shorten that period through regulations or administrative directives.
Administrative guidelines must derive validity from the parent statute and cannot contradict or override it.
This principle has long been settled in Nigerian jurisprudence: where there is a conflict between a statute and subsidiary legislation or administrative action, the statute prevails. INEC’s timetable and guidelines are therefore subordinate instruments which cannot curtail rights granted by the Electoral Act.
Justice Umar’s reasoning therefore aligns with established constitutional doctrine that delegated powers cannot exceed the enabling law.
INEC’s intention may not necessarily have been unlawful in purpose, though the court appears to have found it repulsive in practice.
Permit me to make the following assumptions for the Commission in this matter. INEC may have been motivated to create electoral stability and administrative convenience by that guideline. Again
INEC may probably have sought to stabilize party memberships early enough to prevent last-minute defections, confusion in primaries, and manipulation of candidate lists. Additionally, INEC may have intended to sanitize the process and reduce the abuse associated with politicians maintaining parallel loyalties across parties. And finally,
early submission of membership registers would have allowed INEC sufficient time to verify party memberships and prepare for primaries.
While these intentions from my assumption appear reasonable from an administrative standpoint, administrative convenience cannot override statutory rights created by legislation.
INEC no doubt possesses powers under the Constitution and Electoral Act to issue regulations, guidelines, and timetables for elections. However, such powers are limited by the doctrine of ultra vires. Once INEC issues a guideline inconsistent with the Electoral Act, that guideline becomes null and void to the extent of the inconsistency.
The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that subsidiary legislation cannot amend, vary, or diminish the provisions of a principal statute.
Therefore, if Section 29 grants political parties until 120 days before election to submit candidates’ particulars, INEC cannot indirectly defeat that provision by creating an earlier mandatory membership deadline that effectively forecloses participation.
The implications of this judgment in the political horizon are far-reaching.
The judgment effectively reopens the political transfer window. Politicians dissatisfied with outcomes in their present parties now have additional time to defect and secure nominations elsewhere.
This could trigger unprecedented political realignments before the 2027 elections. Secondly this decision significantly limits INEC’s ability to impose administrative deadlines outside the Electoral Act. It reinforces judicial scrutiny over electoral guidelines and may compel INEC to strictly align future regulations with statutory provisions.
Political parties may now experience prolonged uncertainty in membership structures, candidate negotiations, and internal democracy processes.
Given the national importance of this judgment, the matter may proceed to the Court of Appeal and possibly the Supreme Court for definitive interpretation of the scope of INEC’s regulatory authority under the Electoral Act.
On the positive side, the judgment reinforces a critical democratic principle: statutory bodies cannot govern beyond the powers expressly granted by law.
In conclusion, Justice Umar’s judgment appears substantially consistent with the doctrine of legality and the supremacy of statutory provisions over administrative regulations. While INEC’s intentions may have been driven by legitimate concerns over electoral orderliness and political discipline, the Commission cannot lawfully curtail timelines expressly guaranteed under the Electoral Act through administrative guidelines.
The ruling is therefore a strong judicial reminder that electoral management bodies, no matter how powerful, must operate strictly within the boundaries established by the Constitution and the Electoral Act.
As Nigeria approaches the 2027 elections, this decision may become one of the most consequential electoral rulings shaping party defections, candidate nominations, and the balance of power between INEC and the judiciary.
***M.O . Ubani SAN
Legal Practitioner/Policy Analyst based in Abuja.
F.O
Tags: INEC Membership Deadline