The Donald Trump administration and Iranian negotiators finalised a preliminary Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on June 14 to end active hostilities and establish a 60-day window in which to conclude formal negotiations, according to Pakistan, which mediated the negotiations. It is to be signed on June 19 in Switzerland, after which the Strait of Hormuz will be reopened and the U.S. naval blockade will be lifted.
The MoU has not yet been published in full. Jeffrey Lewis, Distinguished Scholar of Global Security at Middlebury College, wrote on X that he was “pretty sure both the Iranians and the Trump administration will lie egregiously about the contents of the MoU” and that it would be prudent to “wait for the text”.
In the interim, however, important questions linger about Iran’s nuclear programme — the excuse the Trump administration used to escalate a war and which many believe he was ultimately desperate to exit, not least because of the effects of his policy on international oil prices.
The details currently available about the MoU come mainly from unnamed Iranian officials speaking to news agencies, including Reuters. The following analysis therefore distinguishes between the specific language Reuters has reported is included in the draft MoU about the nuclear programme and Iran’s longstanding public positions on them. (“MoU” is used to mean what Reuters has reported.)
Item no. 1
“Tehran agrees it will neither produce nor acquire nuclear weapons”
Long-term position: Iran has consistently maintained that it does not seek nuclear weapons, citing both strategic calculations and a religious decree issued by former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei declaring such weapons forbidden under Islam. Tehran has also repeatedly argued that, as a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), it has a right to peaceful nuclear technology while rejecting accusations that it seeks a bomb.
Successive Iranian governments have accepted similar language, including in the 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (a.k.a. the Iran deal), which explicitly tried to ensure Iran’s programme remained peaceful.
Position immediately before and during the war: Iran continued to deny any intention to build nuclear weapons even as it accumulated large quantities of uranium enriched to 60%. Subsequently it also curtailed access to inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Iranian officials also argued that external pressure and military attacks will force Tehran to reconsider its nuclear doctrine, but they also stopped short of announcing any decision to weaponise.
Has the MoU changed Iran’s position? Not really. Iran has publicly maintained that it neither possesses nor seeks nuclear weapons.
Future possibilities: The key is verification. If in the final agreement — due to be hammered out in the next 60 days — Iran agrees to robust IAEA monitoring, the credibility of its longstanding claims in the international community may improve. If not, scepticism will linger.
Item no. 2
“Pending a final agreement, Iran would maintain the current status of its nuclear programme, refraining from further uranium enrichment and expansion of nuclear facilities”
Long-term position: Iran’s position since the early 2000s has been that enriching uranium on Iranian soil is the nation’s sovereign right. So even when Tehran has accepted temporary restrictions and caps on enrichment levels, it has rejected demands for no enrichment at all. The Iran deal also acknowledged this position and allowed limited enrichment under specific constraints.
Position immediately before and during the war: Before the war, Iran had moved substantially beyond the deal’s limits. According to the IAEA, it had accumulated hundreds of kilograms of uranium enriched up to 60% and an unspecified but large amount of uranium enriched to lower levels. Uranium purified to 60% can be easily made weapons-grade.
According to Iran, these measures were responses to the U.S.’s withdrawal from the Iran deal and the reimposition of sanctions, and that they could be reversed if necessary.
Has the MoU changed Iran’s position? Tactically, perhaps. Iran appears to have accepted a temporary freeze on further expansion rather than dismantlement. The language reported by Reuters explicitly refers to maintaining the “current status” rather than reducing enrichment capacity, which aligns closely with Iran’s longstanding position that its existing capabilities are legitimate and irreversible.
Future possibilities: The main unresolved issue is whether Iran will accept limits on enrichment levels and the number and setup of its centrifuges (devices that enrich uranium). In this regard, some of the possible outcomes include returning to something resembling the deal; a compromise that allows Iran to preserve its enrichment infrastructure while reducing stockpiles and accepting intrusive monitoring; or a breakdown if the U.S. insists on dismantling facilities or stopping enrichment altogether.
Item no. 3
“The U.S. agrees to allow Iran to dilute its stockpile of highly enriched uranium on Iranian soil under a future comprehensive agreement”
Long-term position: Iran has consistently opposed exporting its enriched uranium stockpile abroad. And this issue was contentious even before the Iran deal. Tehran has generally preferred conversion, dilution or storage to be domestic instead of moving nuclear material to third countries because, it has argued, previous agreements failed to protect Iranian interests.
Under the Iran deal, however, Iran had agreed to ship most of its enriched uranium to Russia as part of a broader package to relieve sanctions. Trump now seems to have conceded this position.
Position immediately before and during the war: As Iran’s stockpile of 60% enriched uranium has expanded, officials have also increasingly rejected proposals to remove it from the country. The stockpile also acquired significant strategic value during the war: it became leverage in negotiations and provided a latent deterrent capability without Tehran also crossing the threshold to weaponisation.
Once access to IAEA inspectors deteriorated, the location and status of much of this material also became uncertain. IAEA director-general Rafael Grossi has repeatedly emphasised the importance of accounting for the stockpile.
Has the MoU changed Iran’s position? No. The important phrase is “on Iranian soil”. Reuters has reported that the U.S. has accepted dilution rather than removal abroad. This appears to be a significant U.S. concession and a partial success for Iran.
The remaining uncertainty concerns the extent of the dilution. Reducing uranium from 60% to lower levels would increase Iran’s theoretical breakout time — i.e. the amount of time required to build a nuclear weapon — but the precise technical arrangements will determine how effective the agreement is.
Future possibilities: Some paths include dilution to below 20% enrichment; domestic storage with self-monitoring; and partial exports together with domestic dilution. That said, it bears repeating that the integrity of any arrangement will depend on being able to verify whether the terms of the arrangement are being carried out.
Item no. 4
“Iran’s programme, enrichment activities and stockpile management will be negotiated within 60 days”
Long-term position: Iran has consistently preferred negotiations that recognise its right to enrich uranium domestically and provide reciprocal sanctions relief, and has rejected permanent restrictions. Tehran has also insisted that concessions on its nuclear programme must be matched by suitable economic relief.
Position immediately before and during the war: Before, Iran had sought a negotiated sanctions relief without having to dismantle its programme. During the war, its priority shifted to preserving the programme’s essential infrastructure and securing guarantees against future military attacks, including by Israel.
Has the MoU changed Iran’s position? Not fundamentally. The MoU, as reported by Reuters, appears to defer the hardest questions rather than resolve them. This approach will suit Iran because it preserves existing capabilities while creating space to negotiate sanctions relief and security guarantees.
For now, the most contentious issues also remain unresolved: the maximum level of enrichment allowed, the actual size of Iran’s uranium stockpile, the future of the nuclear complexes at Fordow and Isfahan; the scope of IAEA inspections; and the ordering of sanctions relief and nuclear restrictions.
Future possibilities: With these uncertainties in mind, three broad scenarios are plausible. First, the parties could reach a revised version of the 2015 nuclear deal with more stringent verification. Second, they could agree to freeze the enrichment programme indefinitely without resolving their fundamental disputes. Third, the negotiations could fail if the U.S. insists on stopping enrichment or if the two parties disagree on the extent of sanctions relief.